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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the past ten years there has been a reversal in the relative
importance of official development assistance ("ODA")' versus
private capital flows for developing countries. Once the primary
source of funds for these countries, ODA is now dwarfed by pri-
vate flows, accounting for only eighteen percent of total net long-
term resource flows in 1999.2 Lauded as one of the most important
changes to development finance in recent decades, the growth of
private capital flows is unfortunately irrelevant for far too many
developing countries that already confront decreased official aid
flows.3 Compounding the problem of scarce official aid is the way
in which existing funds are currently programmed. An analysis of
World Bank assistance shows that the vast majority of the Interna-
* Fellow, Institute of International Economic Law and LL.M. candidate,
Georgetown University Law Center (2002); J.D. (1990), B.S. (1987), University of
Oregon.
1 ODA consists of grants and/or loans, the latter provided on a concessional
basis, to qualifying developing countries according to the Development Assis-
tance Committee in order to promote economic and social development. U.N.
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000, at 280 (Bruce
Ross-Larson ed., 2000). Official aid, as opposed to ODA, is provided to countries
that do not qualify as recipients of ODA.
2 See infra tbl. 1.
3 In 1999, for example, ten countries received seventy-seven percent of avail-
able private capital flows to middle and low-income countries. WORLD BANK,
WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDIcATORs 340 (2001).
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tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("IBRD") lending
goes to the countries that already receive the largest share of pri-
vate capital flows.
This Essay briefly examines the relationship between private
capital flows and the World Bank's program of IBRD lending in the
context of the minimal financing available to developing countries.
Section 2 will explore the phenomenon of private capital flows to
developing countries, review which countries receive these funds,
and raise questions regarding the impact of the flows. Section 3
will review the current status of ODA funding and recent thinking
on the effectiveness of development aid. Section 4 will discuss the
role of the World Bank in the provision of official assistance. It will
compare IBRD lending and private capital flows over the past ten
years. The results of this comparison will be used as a basis to
suggest that IBRD be reformed in favor of lending to low-income
countries, particularly given broader financial realities for these
countries.
2. PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS
Whereas ODA represents assistance provided by governments
to developing countries, private capital flows are funds from pri-
vate actors seeking investment opportunities in markets through-
out the world. While industrialized countries have attracted the
lion's share of private capital flows, the proportion has shrunk as
developing country markets have increasingly offered competitive
returns on investment.4
Table 1: Net Private and Official Long-term Flozs to Developing
Countries 1990-1999 (in billions of U.S.$)5
Private Official
1990 42.6 55.9
1991 61.6 62.3
1992 99.7 54.0
1993 165.8 53.4
1994 174.5 45.9
Private Official
1995 203.3 53.9
1996 282.1 31.0
1997 303.9 39.9
1998 267.7 50.6
1999 238.7 52.0
4 Developed countries, however, still account for the majority of private
capital inflows. Seventy-nine percent of foreign direct investment, for instance,
goes to high-income countries. See WORLD BANK, supra note 3, at 342.
5 WORLD BANK, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 2000 ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY
TABLES 36 (2000).
[23:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol23/iss1/1
PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS
Private capital consists of private debt, which includes com-
mercial bank lending and other private credits, and private non-
debt, which includes foreign direct investment ("FDI") and portfo-
lio investment.6 FDI involves the acquisition of more than ten per-
cent of the equity of a company7 in one country by an investor in
another country, where the investor intends to manage the ac-
quired stake.8 Because FDI involves long-term investment in pro-
duction facilities in which investors maintain some measure of
control, during times of financial crisis those funds cannot be
withdrawn with the speed and ease characteristic of portfolio in-
vestmest. Portfolio investment encompasses equity securities, fi-
nancial derivatives, and bonds, all of which are more easily liqui-
dated or rationed in the context of volatile markets and represent
the majority of funds involved in cases of capital flight.
A number of factors have contributed to the growth of private
capital flows to developing markets. First, political and policy
changes have played a significant role. The fall of the Soviet Union
and the move toward market reform in many formerly planned
economies expanded global investment opportunities considera-
bly. The liberalization of international capital flows and the de-
regulation of domestic financial markets have accompanied many
governments' willingness to reconsider development financing
from financial markets.9 Until the 1980s, trade in financial assets
had been held hostage to vestiges of the inter-war experience, at
6 Robert E. Lipsey, The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in International Capital
Flows, in INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS 307,315 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1999).
7 Takatoshi Ito, Capital Flows to East Asia, in INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS
111, 112 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1999).
s WTO Secretariat, Trade and Foreign Direct Investment, PRESS/57, at 6 (Oct. 9,
1996).
9 Domestic policies in the recipient country were identified as playing an im-
portant role in motivating investment decisions. P. Chuhan et al., Equity and Bond
Flows to Asia and Latin America: The Role of Global and Country Factors (World Bank,
Policy Research Working Paper No. 1160,1993), cited in Robert Lensink & Howard
White, Does the Revival of International Private Capital Flows Mean the End of Aid?:
An Analysis of Developing Countries' Access to Private Capital, 26 WORLD DEv. 1221
(1998). Investors may seek private equity, such as domestic demand for services,
and those interested in bonds might look for "current account surpluses that sug-
gest high capacity to repay international debt." Sylvia Maxfield, Understanding the
Political Implications of Financial Internationalization in Emerging Market Countries, 26
WORLD DEv. 1201,1203 (1998).
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which time international speculation wreaked havoc on foreign ex-
change markets.' 0
Second, economic conditions influence the direction and level
of private capital flows. For starters, markets in some developing
countries have been growing more rapidly than those in the in-
dustrialized world," making them an obvious choice for an inves-
tor. Economic conditions in the developed economies, such as low
interest rates and recession, have pushed private capital toward
developing markets.' 2 Easier access to global markets through
technological innovation 13 has facilitated these flows, lowering
transaction costs and distances between financial actors. In the
case of corporations considering direct investment in a developing
country, low-wage labor, the availability and ease of extraction of
natural resources, and opportunities to establish or expand market
share significantly influence decision making.14
For their part, private capital flows offer developing countries
the opportunity to supplement domestic savings for purposes of
high-priority project finance. Benefits extend beyond the avail-
ability of capital, though. FDI brings the recipient country better
technology and management, while portfolio equity investments
force local companies to become more transparent in order to par-
ticipate in international capital markets.'5 Greatly lowered inter-
10 Alberto Giovannini, Borrowing in International Capital Markets: Lessons from
Experience, in PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS TO EMERGING MARKETS AFTER THE MEXICAN
CRISIS 99, 100 (Guillermo A. Calvo et al. eds., 1996).
11 Pier-Luigi Gilibert & Alfred Steinherr, Private Capital Flows to Emerging
Markets After the Mexican Crisis, in PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS TO EMERGING MARKETS
AFrER THE MEXICAN CRISIs, supra note 10, at 115, 120.
12 Giovannini, supra note 10, at 100. In a study of portfolio flows, interna-
tional interest rates have a more substantial impact than country creditworthiness.
Eduardo Fernandez-Arias, The New Wave of Private Capital Inflows: Push or Pull?, 48
J. oF DEv. EcoN. 389, 391 (1996); see also GuILLERMO A. CALVO ET AL., Capital Inflows
and Real Exchange Rate Appreciation in Latin America: The Role of External Factors
(Int'l Monetary Fund, Staff Paper No. 40, 1993) (showing that factors external to a
country's economic situation often drive flows in and out of a country).
13 Symposium, Private Capital and Development: Challenges Facing International
Financial Institutions in a Globalized Economy, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
233, 239 (1999).
14 Guy Pfeffermann, Prospects for Increasing Foreign Direct Investment in Low-
Income Countries, in EXTERNAL FINANCE FOR Low-INCOME COUNTRIES 194, 195
(Zuhair Iqbal & Ravi Kanbur eds., 1997).
15 Martin Feldstein, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS 1, 2 (Martin
Feldstein ed., 1999).
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national transaction costs are also a general result of capital liber-
alization.16
Surges in private capital, both inflows and outflows, are not a
recent phenomenon. The first surge in private capital lasted from
approximately 1870 to 1914 and represented funds channeled to
European colonies in the developing world.17 The second wave ac-
companied the inter-war years, until the onset of the Great Depres-
sion, during which time bonds were utilized to help offset public
sector deficits.18 The third surge took place as a result of the bal-
ance of payment surpluses of the oil-exporting countries in the
1970s. By the early 1980s, annual private capital flows to develop-
ing countries exceeded $100 billion.19 The onslaught of the Mexi-
can debt crisis, caused by Mexico's default on debt repayments,
nearly brought private flows to a halt in 1982. By the 1990s, private
capital flows had recovered, and a fourth wave peaked in 1997,
reaching $303.9 billion.20
2.1. Fluctuations in Flows
While increasing over time, private capital flows have also
proven extremely volatile.21 Crises in one country often have
"spillover" effects across borders, causing capital flight from
neighboring countries.22 The Asian financial crisis, attributable to
the devaluation of the Thai baht, caused global private flows to de-
veloping countries to decrease by approximately $65 billion, or
16 S. Neal McKnight, Note, Stepping Stones to Reform: The Use of Capital Con-
trols in Economic Liberalization, 82 VA. L. REV. 859, 869-70 (1996).
17 WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 119 (citing background paper by Barry
Eichengreen).
18 Id.
19 Philip Turner, Capital Flows in the 1980s: A Survey of Major Trends (Bank of
Int'l Settlements Econ. Papers No. 30, 1991), cited in Cristina Rueda, International
Capital Flows, 1985-1993, at 1 (RAND, 1995).
20 See supra tbl. 1.
21 "The issue area that most urgently requires new institutional innovation is
supervision and regulation of capital markets." C. Fred Bergsten, Managing the
World Economy of the Future, in MANAGING THE WORLD ECONOMY 341, 360 (Peter B.
Kenen ed., 1994).
22 Capital flight has been defined as the concern of an owner of capital that
the "value of [the] asset would be subject to discrete losses.. . [if] held domesti-
cally." S. Ibi Ajayi, An Analysis of External Debt and Capital Flight in the Heavily In-
debted Poor Countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, in EXTERNAL FINANCE FOR LOW-INCOME
CouNTrRIEs, supra note 14, at 77, 82.
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one-fifth of total flows.23 The inflow of private capital to South Ko-
rea, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines was $93
billion in 1995.24 Within two years private capital flows reversed in
those same countries and transformed into a net outflow of $12
billion.25 The pattern is not new. After the Mexican debt crisis, the
flood of private capital that followed recycled petrodollars into de-
veloping countries quickly dried up, turning private capital in-
flows negative.
The volatility of private capital flows, however, has been
somewhat offset by changes in the structure of capital flows over
the past ten years. In 1990, two-thirds of private capital flows con-
sisted of commercial bank lending. By 2000, FDI constituted the
largest source of private capital reaching developing countries. 26
The significance of the change in the proportion of FDI (Table 2)
lies in the fact that FDI itself is a more consistent source of funds
for developing countries, maintaining a level of resilience, unlike
other sources of private funds, despite financial crises.27 Although
FDI grew more slowly in 1998 and 1999, it has continued to in-
crease, while loans and portfolio investment have dropped
sharply.
FDI's staying power can be attributed to its responsiveness to
long rather than short-term economic trends, dependence on labor
and natural resources, neither of which are likely to suffer the im-
mediate consequences of crisis, and ongoing opportunities for
mergers and acquisitions in developing countries. 28 FDI to devel-
oping countries is forecasted by the World Bank to increase during
23 WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 36. The crisis in East Asia "had its roots in
excessive private sector debt and weak financial and corporate institutions in the
countries most affected, as well as abrupt changes in risk perceptions on the part
of creditors." WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 120.
24 Symposium, supra note 13, at 242. While the outflow is a result of eco-
nomic and political events, it is also a byproduct of "herd" behavior, where for-
eign and domestic investors seek to unload assets before they are severely depre-
ciated. Mark Weisbrot, Exceptions and Conditions: Globalization for Whom?, 31
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 631, 648 (1998). For further analysis on investor behavior and
contagion effects, see Graham Bird & Joseph P. Joyce, Remodeling the Multilateral
Financial Institutions, 7 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 75, 79 (2001).
25 Symposium, supra note 13, at 242.
26 WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 35.
27 Id. at 134.
28 Id. at 42
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2000-2001 at approximately the same rate as respective rates of
Gross Domestic Product ("GDP")29
Table 2: Composition of Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries
1990-1999 (in billions of U.S.$)30
FDI Equity Debt
1990 24.1 2.8 15.7
1991 35.3 7.6 18.8
1992 47.5 14.1 38.1
1993 66.0 51.0 48.8
1994 88.8 35.2 50.5
1995 105.0 36.1 62.2
1996 130.8 49.2 102.1
1997 170.3 30.2 103.4
1998 170.9 15.6 81.2
1999 192.0 27.6 19.1
2.2. Countries Receiving Private Capital
In addition to overall volatility, private capital flows are un-
evenly distributed across developing countries, with Latin America
and East Asia receiving the bulk of these flows. The ten largest re-
cipients of private capital flows over the past ten years have been
in Asia and Latin America. East Asia has drawn the majority of
private capital flows due to several factors: political and macro-
economic stability, a welcoming environment for potential inves-
tors, and economic development as a principal object of policy-
making by governments in the region.31 Funds flowing to Latin
America followed the reform and modernization programs initially
undertaken by Chile and Mexico, and subsequently by Colombia,
Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina, and Brazil.32
Private capital has largely bypassed low-income countries and
heavily indebted countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa.s3
Middle-income countries received more than ninety percent of pri-
29 Id. at 46.
30 Id. at 36.
31 Moeen Qureshi, Capital Flows and the East Asian Financial Crisis, in
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLoWS, supra note 15, at 172-
32 Sebastian Edwards, Capital Inflows to Latin America: A Stop-Go Story?, in
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS, supra note 15, at 5, 6.
33 Lensink & White, supra note 9, at 1230-32.
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vate capital flows to the developing world during the 1990s.34 In
one study, forty of sixty-nine developing countries, for which data
existed, faced sufficiently serious structural problems as to make
the receipt of private capital flows unlikely.35 In the case of Africa,
political instability and a poor macroeconomic environment have
severely curtailed the interest of foreign investors.36 In 1997 and
1998, sub-Saharan Africa received $12.5 billion 37 in private capital,
of which South Africa and Nigeria accounted for sixty-seven per-
cent.38 Disaggregating the flows to account for the relatively pow-
erful economies of South Africa and Nigeria, the balance of sub-
Saharan Africa received only $4.2 billion.39 Worldwide private
flows during the same period exceeded $526 billion, of which East
Asia and Pacific countries and Latin America received $377 bil-
lion.40 Although growth in sub-Saharan Africa is forecasted to be
3.8% by 200241 and highly indebted poor countries ("HIPC") debt
restructuring packages should be prepared for more than twenty
countries, a substantial increase in private capital flows to the re-
gion is unlikely. The situation in sub-Saharan Africa is representa-
tive generally of private flows to low-income countries. Although
private capital flows to these countries increased from just $3.5 bil-
lion in 1990 to $15.2 billion in 1998, the proportion is tiny in com-
34 WORLD BANK, GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 1999 ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY
TABLES 37 (1999).
35 Lensink & White, supra note 9, at 1232. Countries also face the problem in
reverse, managing too much in the way of inflows. Capital inflows to Malaysia
ranged from ten to twenty percent of GDP during the early to mid-1990s and ex-
ceeded ten percent in Thailand during the same period. Substantial inflows force
up currency values, jeopardizing export industries, and widen current account
imbalances. Zhang Shengman, Capital Flows to East Asia, in INTERNATIONAL
CAPITAL FLOwS, supra note 15, at 177, 179. Substantial capital inflows may over-
whelm the ability of officials to regulate the economy and the capacity of the pri-
vate sector to use the money. McKnight, supra note 16, at 862.
36 See generally Ajayi, supra note 22 (discussing capital flight in sub-Saharan
Africa).
37 WORLD BANK, supra note 34, at 171.
38 Calculated from World Bank data on aggregate net resources to develop-
ing countries. Id.
39 Id. The figures illustrate the view of one author that in lower income
countries in Africa, "there is no private sector to speak of." Paul Mosley, The
World Bank, "Global Keynesianism" and the Distribution of the Gains from Growth, 25
WORLD DEv. 1949,1953 (1997).
40 WORLD BANK, supra note 34, at 171.
41 WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 11.
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parison to overall flows to developing countries.42 In 1998, devel-
oping countries received a total of $267.7 billion in private flows.43
The International Monetary Fund ("IME") has voiced "cautious
optimism" in relation to the recovery of declines in overall flows in
the wake of the financial crises in Brazil, Russia, and Asia between
1997 and 1999,44 with FDI remaining strong, recovery in portfolio
flows, and increased repayment to banks. 45 The World Bank pro-
jected private capital flows to developing countries to reach $220 to
$230 billion in 2001, an improvement but still less than the peak
reached in 1996-1997.46 FDI is projected to continue its modest
growth, restrained somewhat by decreases in mergers and acquisi-
tions. 47
For those countries that have been able to benefit from the
availability of private funds,48 growth has not been without con-
troversy. Rapid capital outflows in these countries reduce growth,
erode the tax base,4 9 and have a pernicious impact on the poor
50
and social development generally.5' The World Bank estimated
that the number of persons living in poverty doubled in East Asia
following the financial crisis, after two decades of decreases in the
42 WORLD BANK, supra note 34, at 37.
43 WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 36.
44 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS 44
(2000).
45 Id. at 76.
46 WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 22.
47 Id. at 22-23.
43 Formerly, multinational entities represented the developing world's de-
pendence on the industrialized countries and have been transformed into the
"saviors" of development DANI RODRIK, THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: MAKING OPENNESS WORK 37 (Overseas Development
Council Policy Essay No. 24,1999).
49 See Manuel Pastor, Jr., Capital Flight from Latin America, 18 WORLD DEv. 1
(1990). As private wealth is put beyond the reach of government taxing power,
land and labor are commonly substituted to make up the burden, which is likely
to be regressive. Ajayi, supra note 22, at 84.
50 For a discussion concerning the difficulty for small economies to withstand
the impact of substantial capital movements, see Ronnie C. Chan, Whither Global
Capital Flow?, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 5,1998, at 33.
51 Raymond F. Mikesell, Bretton Woods - Original Intentions and Current Prob-
lems, 18 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 404 (2000), relying on WORLD BANK, GLOBAL
ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1998-99 (1999).
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number of persons living in absolute poverty.5 2 Developing coun-
tries seeking money in a competitive marketplace may have the ef-
fect of degrading workers' rights and environmental protection.53
Private capital flows have also grown, in part, as a result of its
almost faddish popularity, rather than as a part of a coherent in-
vestment program.5 4 Despite a formulaic notion regarding the cri-
teria to attract private capital, flows go to larger markets such that
"low-income countries cannot expect much in the way of private
flows even if they have good rule of law and sound economic poli-
cies."5 5 Claims as to the beneficial impact of FDI, such as technol-
ogy transfer and labor training, are not necessarily borne out in
fact.5 6 The link between growth and direct investment is also un-
clear. The presence of FDI, now by far the largest portion of pri-
vate capital, may be a result of already existing strong growth fig-
ures, where private investment will seek out, rather than cause,
profitable and productive economies.5 7 One study of FDI in devel-
oping countries concluded that the rationale that FDI is good for a
country's development is not upheld by data.58
52 Persons living in absolute poverty dropped from six of ten in the 1970s to
two of ten by the mid-1990s. Joseph E. Stiglitz, The World Bank at the Millennium,
109 ECON. J. 577,595 (1999).
53 Jerome I. Levinson, The International Financial System: A Flawed Architecture,
23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 1 (1999).
54 John Williamson, Comment, in PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS TO EMERGING
MARKETS AFrER THE MEXICAN CRISIS, supra note 10, at 112, 119. Also, "it must be
recognized that despite the many benefits they bring, they can create problems by
distorting economic realities." Chan, supra note 50, at 33.
5 ALBERTO ALESINA & DAVID DOLLAR, WHO GIVES FOREIGN AID TO WHOM AND
WHY? 24 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6612, 1998).
56 See generally Rodrik, supra note 48 (suggesting the same).
57 Barry Bosworth & Susan Collins, Capital Inflows, Investment, and Growth
(Brookings Institution 1998), cited in RODRIK, supra note 48, at 37. Another com-
mentator has noted, that
[s]everal emerging economies do indeed present excellent opportunities
for efficient portfolio diversification because they combine ample na-
tional resources, skilled work forces, open trade policies, and the ability
to benefit from technology transfers from nearby industrialized countries
.... Not all emerging markets share these advantages equally, however,
so that selectivity will still characterize such capital flows.
Gilibert & Steinherr, supra note 11, at 120.
58 MANUEL R. AGOSIN & RICARDO MAYER, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: DOES IT CROWD IN DOMESTIC INVESTMENT? 14 (UNCTAD Discussion
Paper No. 146, Feb. 2000).
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Overall, there are three critical issues related to private capital
flows in developing countries. First, low-income countries, as a
group, have severely limited or no access to private capital. Sec-
ond, for the handful of these countries that do receive some private
capital, they remain particularly vulnerable to the impacts of capi-
tal flight and have yet to benefit from the increased stability linked
to the growing proportion of FDI. Third, there are legitimate
questions as to the basis upon which private capital is invested and
its effectiveness. Although a deeper exploration of the latter point
is beyond the scope of this Article, it has obvious implications for
developing countries that belie the popularly held view that pri-
vate investment is the saving grace for the developing world.
3. OFFIcIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
In 1960, the United Nations ("U.N.") General Assembly en-
dorsed a specific target for ODA of 1% of national incomes, based
on a suggestion by the World Council of Churches in 1958.59 The
target was subsequently decreased to 0.7% of Gross National
Product ("GNP") in 1975.60 As of 1998, though, external aid to de-
veloping countries represented only 0.24% of the GDP of Devel-
opment Assistance Countries ("DAC"), a slight increase over
1997.61 ODA has been declining generally since 1990, when the
percent of combined GNP of the DAC allocated to ODA was
0.33 %.62 The decline has been a result of changing domestic budget
priorities, the decreasing strategic importance of aid following the
end of the Cold War, and new questions as to the effectiveness of
aid.63 Development assistance at the end of the decade was $3.5
59 Ambassador Emilio J. Cardenas, Minister Carlos Sersale di Cerisano & Sec-
retary Oscar Avalle, The Changing Aid Debate: Perspectives on the Official Develop-
ment Assistance Debate, 2 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 189,190 (1995).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. One study has noted that global growth may help offset decreases in
ODA. Specifically, economic growth would give current donors more money to
spend on aid, middle income countries will reach developed country status and
dispense aid of their own, and some low-income countries will experience suffi-
cient improvement to allocate aid to other countries. Paul Collier, Redesigning the
Aid Relationship (1999) (unpublished manuscript for Joint Conference of African
Ministers of Finance and Ministers of Economic Planning), cited in A.A.G. Ali et
al., Official Development Assistance to Africa: An Overview, 8 J. AFR. ECON. 504, 515-
16 (1999).
63 WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 60.
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billion less than at the start, a real cut of 30% in constant dollar
terms.64 Aid flows now stand at their lowest level, as a share of
GNP, since the 1950s. 65
Currently, official finance is a higher percentage of external fi-
nancial flows to sub-Saharan Africa than any other area in the
world.66 A sample of thirty-four low-income countries in sub-
Saharan Africa shows them receiving, on average, the equivalent of
21.2% of their respective GNP during the first five years of the
1990s, more than double the proportion of any other region.67 East
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa received 51.7% of ODA in 1999.68
Nonetheless, in a number of countries across Africa, macroeco-
nomic reform is taking place, and official aid provided in the near
future will play a critical role in making more of Africa attractive to
private investment.69 In a world of tightening aid budgets, a de-
veloping country's ability to attract private capital can be a critical
factor in the provision of aid, where access to private flows might
64 OXFAM INT'L, RIGGED TRADE AND NOT MUCH AID: RICH COUNTRIES HELP TO
KEEP THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES POOR 2 (May 2001), available at
http://www.wtowatch.org/library (last visited Feb. 20, 2002).
65 WORLD BANK, ASSESSING AID 2 (World Bank Policy Research Report 1998).
The lack of available resources bodes poorly for least developed countries in par-
ticular.
If current trends continue, only one country will reach the $900 per cap-
ita income threshold for exiting LDC status in the next 50 years. Moreo-
ver, the LDCs will miss by a wide margin the 2015 human development
targets of halving poverty, reducing child mortality by three-quarters,
and achieving universal primary education.
OXFAM, supra note 64, at 1.
The low levels of official aid are not the only area in which the industrialized
countries have been less than supportive of low-income countries. For example,
in trade relations, "[flor every $1 that Bangladesh receives from Canada in aid, it
loses another $36 through trade restrictions.... For every $1 that Cambodia re-
ceives from the USA, trade restrictions cost the country another $4." Id. at 5.
66 Amar Bhattacharya et al., Private Capital Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa: An
Overview of Trends and Determinants, in EXTERNAL FINANCE FOR LOW-INCOME
COUNTRIES, supra note 14, at 207.
67 WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 65.
68 WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 60. "[A]id to... poorer countries focuses on
the social programmes -mainly education, health, water supply and sanitation-
and next on economic infrastructure, such as transport and energy projects. The
mix changes as the country moves up the income scale, in line with the recipients'
new socio-economic situation." Yasmin Ahmad, Development Aid: Snapshots of Re-
cent Trends, OECD OBSERVER, Mar. 1999, at46, 47.
69 Paul Collier, Aid 'Dependency': A Critique, 8 J. AFR. EcoN. 528, 544 (1999).
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make a country ineligible for official assistance. 70 Absent recent
donor budget restraints, official flows have tended to be counter-
cyclical to private, non-FDI flows.71
Separate from actual levels of aid flows, there has been a recent
change in thinking about aid effectiveness. 72 First, aid disbursed in
a good policy environment helps attract private investment and
acts as a catalyst for faster growth and improvements in social de-
velopment. 3 Unfortunately, aid has been as likely to go to coun-
tries with conducive policy environments as to those without.74
Second, aid should also be targeted appropriately. Countries that
maintain sound macroeconomic policies and deliver public serv-
ices should receive budget support. Countries that have estab-
lished the policies, but have limited capacity to deliver services,
should receive assistance aimed at improving public expenditure.75
However, Burnside and Dollar argue that there is no evidence that
foreign aid actually encourages the adoption of sound macroeco-
nomic policies.76
70 Analytic factors have been suggested on the basis of which countries
would be determined as able to function absent aid due to private flows. Lensink
& White, supra note 9, at 1225. For example, Hemandez and Rudolph have identi-
fied countries that they consider to be "high private-capital recipients," where the
ratio between the "annual inflow of private capital and GDP exceeds two per-
cent" Leonardo Hernfindez & Heinz Rudolph, Sustainability of Private Capital
Flows to Developing Countries: Is a Generalized Reversal Likely? (World Bank, Policy
Research Working Paper No. 1518,1995), cited in Lensink & White, supra note 9, at
1225.
71 WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 73.
72 The ability of aid to assist impoverished countries has been a controversial
issue. "It remains the case that the measured ability of aid flows to trigger sus-
tained growth in developing countries has been poor, and particularly poor in the
poorest countries." Paul Mosley, supra note 39, at 1951.
73 WORLD BANK, supra note 65, at 4. It has also been found that aid is neutral
relative to development and is dependent for its effects on government policy. See
Cecelia Lopez, Impact of External Aid on Latin America 1972-1992 (Tercer Mundo
1997) (original in Spanish), cited in WORLD BANK, supra note 65, at 37. In an ad-
dress last year, former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers identified
"national policies [for reform] in the developing countries" as a "basic reality" of
the 21st century necessary to foster growth. Lawrence H. Summers, Development
& Integration: A New Global Consensus, PRESIDENTS & PRIME MINISTERS, July-Aug.
2000, at 7.
74 WORLD BANK, supra note 65, at 4.
7 Id. at5.
76 David Dollar & William Easterly, The Search for the Key: Aid, Investment and
Policies in Africa, 8 J. AFR. ECON. 546, 562 (1999) (discussing the relationship be-
tween foreign aid and macroeconomic policies).
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In Africa, official flows have promoted uneven growth. Dollar
and Easterly found that recent strategies, including both "aid-
financed investment" and "aid-induced policy reform," have been
failures.7 The study found that absent a domestic constituency for
reform, foreign aid is unlikely to generate reform even when con-
ditionality so stipulates.78 "Even when a country tries to imple-
ment economic policies to foster pro-poor growth and mount tar-
geted poverty programs, inept or unresponsive governance
institutions can nullify the impact."79
Poor performance on the part of receiving countries has di-
minished aid effectiveness but so has the pattern of foreign aid.
Specifically, aid does not necessarily flow to countries which have
chosen good policies. Alesina and Dollar found considerable evi-
dence that aid disbursement is dictated by political and strategic
considerations.80 Although countries that pursue democratic re-
form have been rewarded with a fifty percent increase in foreign
aid, "[a]n inefficient, economically closed, mismanaged non-
democratic former colony politically friendly to its former colo-
nizer, receives more foreign aid than another country with [sic]
similar level of poverty, a superior policy stance, but without a
past as a colony."81 Dollar and Svensson found that nearly all ad-
justment loans disperse fully, even when policy conditions are not
met.82
The determinants of aid do vary and encompass strategic con-
siderations, political conditions in the recipient country, poverty,
and colonial history. Nonetheless, U.N. voting patterns and a co-
lonial past explain more of the distribution of aid than the institu-
tions or policies of recipient countries.8 3 Donors were also faulted
77 Id.
78 Id. at 568.
79 UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, OVERCOMING HUMAN POVERTY
54 (2000).
80 ALESINA & DOLLAR, supra note 55, at 1.
81 Id.
82 David Dollar & Jakob Svensson, Ahat Explains the Success or Failure of Struc-
tural Adjustment Programmes, 110 ECON. J. 894, 896 (2000).
83 ALESINA & DOLLAR, supra note 55, at 5. Among the donor nations, Japan
rewards developing countries with aid if they vote with Japan in the U.N. (more
than France or the United States), the United States gives one-third of its aid to
Israel and Egypt, and France and the U.K. give over half and three-quarters of
their aid, respectively, to former colonies. Id. at 9, 13-16. For these countries in
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in another study, where poor recipient capacity for monitoring and
evaluating inflows of aid leads to donors taking a more invasive
role in decisions regarding public expenditure, thereby weakening
recipient capadty.84
For developing countries, particularly those more dependent
on ODA, overall developments related to aid are not encouraging.
First, in both real dollar terms and as a percentage of GDP, ODA is
decreasing, with no sign of an imminent reversal. Second, while it
has become dear that an appropriate policy-making environment
in recipient countries can help less overall aid go further, policies
in aid-dispensing countries serve as variables which potentially
offsets those gains. ODA falls far short of both need and the com-
mitments made by the industrialized nations to the developing
world.
4. THE WORLD BANK
The active role the World Bank plays in development today,
largely taken for granted, was a less than certain possibility at its
inception.85 The sister institutions, the World Bank and the IMF,
were created as part of a new global monetary system that would
prohibit the resurgence of the economic chaos of the 1930s, which
contributed significantly to the start of World War II. Multilateral
lending, like official development assistance, is of recent vintage.
Although the international financial organizations have institu-
tionalized multilateral lending, its origins lie in the specialized
agencies of the U.N., premised on the fact that private capital mar-
kets could not provide the resources needed for postwar recon-
struction.8
6
The World Bank's core mission today is the promotion of eco-
nomic growth and the eradication of poverty in the less developed
countries.87 To do so, it provides loans through the IBRD and,
more recently, through loans at concessional rates and grants via
particular, bilateral aid is only weakly associated with important factors such as
policy, democracy, and poverty. Id. at 23.
84 Ali et al., supra note 62, at 524.
85 1 DEVESH KAPUR ET AL., THE WORLD BANK: ITS FIRST HALF CENTURY 58
(1997).
86 DANI RODRIK, Why Is There Multilateral Lending?, WORKING PAPER SERIES 1
(1995).
87 Stiglitz, supra note 52, at 580.
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the International Development Association ("IDA").88 The World
Bank channels only a portion of ODA flows, the balance of which
is provided by governments on a bilateral basis.89 The provision of
IBRD loans have been the World Bank's principal activity, through
which funds are borrowed and lent to member governments at a
rate slightly higher than the World Bank's borrowing rate but more
favorable than the private sector rate.90 IBRD loans totaling $349
billion have been provided to middle-income countries and cred-
itworthy poorer countries since its establishment in 1945. IBRD
lending in fiscal year 2000 was $10.9 billion, approximately half of
the lending totals in each of 1998 and 1999, when financial crises in
the Russian Federation, Thailand, the Republic of Korea, Indonesia,
Argentina, and Brazil required funds to help stabilize those
economies.91 The demand for IBRD lending in 2000 returned to
more normal levels following the crises and has in fact dropped to
seventy-one percent of average lending over the period 1992-
1997.92
The IDA was established in 1960, bringing to the World Bank
concessional lending intended to meet the needs of economies too
poor to service external borrowing and in need of support to create
the structures necessary for development.93 The IDA works with
88 Article I of the Articles of Agreement of the IDA states that its purposes
"are to promote economic development, increase productivity and thus raise
standards of living in the less-developed areas of the world .... " 1 IBRAHIM F.I.
SHIHATA, THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 391 (Franziska Tschofen &
Antonio R. Parra eds., 1991).
89 Although beyond the scope of this Essay, the combination of readily avail-
able private capital and bilateral aid raises the question of the usefulness of mul-
tilateral aid in general. RODRIK, supra note 86, at 1. Rodrik has critiqued multilat-
eral lending as valuable not because of the lending itself but due to the
advantages that multilateral institutions have over bilateral ones. The benefits
extend first to the conditionality that multilateral institutions are able to exercise
because of their autonomy from governments. Second, multilateral institutions
are in a better position to benefit from the "collective good" of information as to
investing environments. Id. at 2. There is, though, "no independent economic ra-
tionale for multilateral lending per se." Id. at 31.
90 Christopher L. Gilbert & David Vines, The World Bank: An Overview of Some
Major Issues, in THE WORLD BANK STRUCTURE AND POLICIEs 10, 13 (Christopher L.
Gilbert & David Vines eds., 2000). IBRD "borrows against member government
guarantees and either lends or guarantees loans to member governments ...
against governmental guarantees." Id. at 13.
91 WORLD BANK, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 33 (2000).
92 Id. (calculated from figures in the report).
93 KAPUR ET AL., supra note 85, at 1121. The establishment of the IDA was also
a response to fears that concessional lending within the context of IBRD opera-
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sixty countries, primarily in Africa and South Asia, which have low
per capita rates of GDp.94 Loans are payable over a period up to
forty years, double the most favorable terms available through
IBRD, and at heavily reduced interest rates.95 Resources are based
on replenishments from member governments, IBRD net income,
and IDA's own resources. In fiscal year 2000, IDA lending totaled
$4.4 billion, forty-seven percent of which was allocated to Africa.96
IDA has set fifty percent of annual lending as its target for support
to Africa, reflecting the chronic poverty in the region. Twenty-
seven percent of 2000 lending targeted South Asia. The IDA and
co-financing from bilateral and multilateral donors are likely to be
the only source of funds fending off disaster for the poorest coun-
tries.97
The lack of private financial investment in low-income coun-
tries that makes IDA lending, and ODA generally, so critical, is
more widely available in those countries that are recipients of
IBRD lending and has had a substantial impact on demand for the
lending. The dramatic increase in capital flows over the past ten
years have caused World Bank lending and borrowing to stagnate
overall, with middle-income countries, the principal beneficiaries
of private capital, preferring equity financing at least in part due to
the calamitous experience with debt instruments in the 1980s and
1990s.98
Middle-income countries have also been attracted to the less
onerous compliance requirements and diminished scrutiny im-
plied by private market financing, decreasing administrative, fi-
nancial, and political costs.99 The result has been the erosion of the
World Bank's position by the market, ironically a sign of success in
the World Bank's efforts to offset capital market imperfections.
Overall, increases in IBRD lending have been short-lived and for
tions would threaten the World Bank's financial reputation. The IDA was in-
tended to act as "a safety valve to permit economic and financial support to
countries which are not credit-worthy but, if it were not available, would proba-
bly get some Bank lending at the margin and, in so doing, I believe jeopardize the
financial credibility of the Bank." Id. at 1067.
94 Gilbert & Vines, supra note 90, at 12.
95 Id.
96 WORLD BANK, supra note 91, at 10.
97 Mosley, supra note 39, at 1953.
93 KAPUR ET AL., supra note 85, at 1112-13.
99 Mosley, supra note 39, at 1952.
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the sole purpose of responding to calls to offset destabilizing forces
in private capital markets during financial crises. o00 The larger
trend of stagnation in IBRD lending posits an important question
as to its relevancy and legitimacy when private capital is avail-
able. 01
Table 3: Percent of IBRD Lending to the Ten Largest Recipients of
Private Capital Flows 1990-1999102
1990 41%
1991 45%
1992 46%
1993 53%
1994 49%
1995 52%
1996 51%
1997 59%
1998 71%
1999 51%
Average 52%
100 The IMF may be the most obvious candidate to provide emergency assis-
tance to offset financial crises caused by volatile capital flows, given its stabilizing
role in monetary systems. The IMF could act to "coordinate the activities of other
official agencies while encouraging private lenders to take a tractable approach
toward debt restructuring. The IliF also plays a valuable role in providing assis-
tance to countries when private funds are not available." Joseph Joyce, The IMF
and Global Financial Crises, CHALLENGE, July/ Aug. 2000, at 102.
101 Questions as to the effectiveness and results of World Bank lending are
not new. The World Bank has "for decades, financed governments . . . whose
policies have been antithetical to growth and have been responsible for poor peo-
ple's misery in the first place." Ian Vasquez, The Role of Multi-lateral Institutions in
African Development, 30 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 703 (1999). The criticism has also
been made that World Bank lending is premised on the input of experts who are
"completely out of touch with the local African reality," leading to a situation in
which development planning for Africa takes shape in Washington, D.C. George
B.N. Ayittey, How the Multilateral Institutions Compounded Africa's Economic Crisis,
30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 585 (1999). Already by 1989, the number of expatriate
consultants employed by the Bank to work on economic difficulties in Africa ex-
ceeded 80,000, costing over U.S. $1 billion per year. Id. at 587. Since World Bank
and IMF structural adjustments were instituted in the 1980s in Latin America, the
region has had a growth rate of approximately zero and has become disillusioned
with democratic reform. Weisbrot, supra note 24, at 634. For an evaluation of
structural adjustment, see JAYATI DATrA-MTRA, FISCAL MANAGEMENT IN
ADJUSTMENT LENDING (1997).
102 Based on data from infra apps. I & II.
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Instructively, paragraph ii of the Articles of Agreement of the
IBRD states that one purpose of the IBRD is "[t]o promote private
foreign investment... and when private capital is not available on
reasonable terms, to supplement private investment by providing,
on suitable conditions, finance for productive purposes out of its
own capital, funds raised by it and its other resources." 10 3 Table 3
indicates quite dearly that over the past ten years, IBRD loans are
increasingly being made available to countries which already have
access to private market capital and account for the receipt of over
three-quarters of all flows, on average. In 1990, an already sub-
stantial forty-one percent of IBRD's loan portfolio went to the ten
largest recipients of private capital flows. By 1998, the proportion
rose to an alarming seventy-one percent, decreasing to fifty-one
percent in 1999. These figures, though, only represent an analysis
of IBRD's lending schemes relative to the ten largest recipients of
private capital flows. Reviewing all of IBRD's lending each year
relative to all recipients of private capital flows increases the pro-
portions.
Should World Bank lending be reformed such that funds pre-
viously available to countries receiving massive levels of private
capital are re-channeled to low-income countries? The answer is a
resounding yes, and it is here that earlier conclusions reinforce the
need for change for which empirical evidence is already so strong.
Despite the increase in EDI as a mitigating factor against volatile
private capital flows,10 4 there is no sign private funds will reach
low-income countries anytime soon. ODA flows are likely to re-
main stagnant or decrease based on analyses of the past ten years
of contributions, including IDA replenishments. With the shrink-
ing pot of official assistance and the variables of both recipient and
donor country policies potentially undermining the effectiveness of
103 SHIHATA, supra note 88, at 345.
104 Despite the stabilizing influence of FDI, improvements in the international
financial architecture, and improved regulatory frameworks, the World Bank
forecasts continued high volatility and frequent crises, citing "marginally credit-
worthy borrowers and volatility in risk assessments," "herding and contagion,"
"systemic risks and moral hazard," and "financial innovations" (which promote
speculation). WORLD BANK, supra note 5, at 134. Previous surges in capital flows
"were punctuated by currency and financial instability in the capital receiving
countries, and eventually ended in global political or economic crisis." Id. at 119.
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aid,05 the need to spend available funds judiciously and effectively
is even more urgent.
5. CONCLUSION
The challenge is not to simply cut off the countries that are si-
multaneously receiving private capital and IBRD lending but
rather to identify those countries that consistently receive private
capital and those which receive it sporadically. Lending should
then be shifted away from the former to low-income countries that
create policies conducive to sustainable development. To the ex-
tent that low-income countries face a shortcoming in external fi-
nance for development projects from private sources, or support
for poverty alleviation, the World Bank should be there to lend
greater assistance. Given stagnant lending levels over the past ten
years, interrupted only by crisis lending in 1998-1999, there is al-
ready ample reason to review World Bank programming.
This change in priorities for World Bank lending is a realistic
and practical step in the context of international efforts to promote
growth and reduce poverty. Ideally, it will be accompanied by a
sober discussion on the availability and impact of private capital
for the poorest developing countries and a serious commitment on
the part of the international community to fulfilling its financial
commitments to the developing world.
105 The World Bank has stated there are grounds for thinking that the use of
available funds may become more effective as greater percentages of existing as-
sistance are provided to countries with good policies. WORLD BANK, supra note 5,
at 61.
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APPENDIX I
Table 4: Top Ten Developing Country and Emerging Market
Recipients of Net Private Capital Flows 1990-1999 (in
millions of U.S.$)106
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APPENDIX II
Table 5: IBRD Lending to the Top Ten Recipients of Private Capital
1990-1999 (in millions of U.S.$)107
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Table 6: Total IBRD Lending Per Year (in millions of U.S.$)108
1990 15,179
1991 16,392
1992 15,156
1993 16,945
1994 14,244
1995 16,853
1996 14,656
1997 14,524
1998 21,086
1999 22,182
1os Id.
2002]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
* * * * * *
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol23/iss1/1
